Surface argument is more of the same from Google's Motorola on patent royalties

Yesterday was the first day of the Microsoft v. Motorola Mobility FRAND rate-setting trial in the Western District of Washington. I did a post on the relevance of the underlying issue to startups.
While I can't attend this one physically, I have been following this case closely ever since it started two years ago and there are great online resources to find out about developments in Seattle. I have set up a public Twitter list named MicrosoftMotoFRANDtrial, replicating the tweets from several reporters who reported from the courtroom. Here are links to several media reports on the first day (in alphabetical order):
The most interesting testimony tidbits that I saw on Twitter relate to Motorola's participation in the negotiations that led to the formation of the MPEG LA AVC/H.264 pool. Motorola didn't ultimately participate in the pool, but according to testimony presented yesterday, it was actually arguing in favor of low per-unit rates and a royalty cap that is even lower than the one MPEG LA ultimately adopted. A witness also said that Motorola didn't argue at that stage that its patents were more valuable, relative to their number, than the average of all other patents contributed to the pool. But at this point, the now wholly-owned Google subsidiary does claim that its patents are more valuable than the patents in the pool. I have seen this argument in court filings and I heard it in open court in Mannheim, Germany, in February.
Unless Motorola's own witnesses can provide some really good reasons for this change of mind, its earlier position on the appropriate H.264 royalty rate will strongly undermine the positions it takes today.
I'm actually not surprised that Motorola took an innovation- and consumer-friendly position years ago. There may be cases in which contributors to standards engage in long-term ambush strategies, starting with violations of their disclosure obligations and other attempts to manipulate the standard-setting process. But it appears that in most cases companies are constructive participants in the process -- not necessarily saints though -- and just change their approach later, either because patent monetization becomes a higher priority to them (typically after their operating business shrinks) or because they have a major infringement problem and hope that standard-essential patents give them leverage for cross-license agreements that allow them to get away with their infringement of non-standard-essential patents. In a recent post I said that "I'm inclined to believe that Samsung used to be a good citizen of the standard-setting universe until it got sued by Apple and decided to cling to its SEPs as a strategic weapon, in an act of desperation because it lacks powerful non-standard-essential patents of the kind that would give it leverage against Apple."
Unlike Samsung, which apparently played a defensive role in connection with SEPs until the dispute with Apple began, Motorola has previously been somewhat aggressive in SEP assertions (such as against Research In Motion). Still, it may have been much more reasonable when the MPEG LA pool was being formed -- or (which I don't know and won't be able to find out) it may have had bad intentions from the beginning, participating in those talks in bad faith in order to bring down prices and ultimately deciding to monetize its H.264 SEPs on its own in a rent-seeking effort. Whatever Motorola's motivation may have been, the discrepancy between the positions it took then and the ones it takes now reflects unfavorably on it in this FRAND contract litigation. It will have some explaining to do.
Reporters noted yesterday that the next-generation Xbox gaming console, codenamed Durango, and the Surface tablet were mentioned. That's mostly because Google (Motorola) tries to argue that new and upcoming devices complicate the FRAND rate-setting process. It suggests that over time it will be entitled to higher royalties because of changes to Microsoft's product offerings. Here's a very telling passage from its trial brief:
"Microsoft's new Surface tablet will use only 802.11, instead of cellular or wired connections, to connect to the internet. [...] Without 802.11 capability, the Surface tablet would be unable to compete in the market, because consumers can readily select tablet devices other than the Surface that have 802.11 capability."
The first sentence states an undeniable truth, though I don't know if cellular versions of the Surface tablet will at some point become available. The second sentence mirrors Motorola's hold-up logic: you need to implement the standard so you must pay a lot for anybody's patents declared essential to the standard. The less of a choice you have, the higher the price will be. But that's not the way to calculate a FRAND royalty. I'll just quote Judge Posner on this:
"There is another decisive objection to Motorola's damages claim. The proper method of computing a FRAND royalty starts with what the cost to the licensee would have been of obtaining, just before the patented invention was declared essential to compliance with the industry standard, a license for the function performed by the patent. That cost would be a measure of the value of the patent qua patent. But once a patent becomes essential to a standard, the patentee's bargaining power surges because a prospective licensee has no alternative to licensing the patent; he is at the patentee's mercy. The purpose of the FRAND requirements, the validity of which Motorola doesn't question, is to confine the patentee's royalty demand to the value conferred by the patent itself as distinct from the additional value--the hold-up value--conferred by the patent's being designated as standard-essential. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 313–14 (3d Cir. 2007); Daniel G. Swanson & William J. Baumol, 'Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory (RAND) Royalties, Standards Selection, and Control of Market Power,' 73 Antitrust L.J. 1, 7–11 (2005). Motorola has provided no evidence for calculating a reasonable royalty that would be consistent with this point."
Motorola didn't create wireless networking as a whole. It would be possible to build fully functional wireless networks without infringing on its IEEE 802.11 declared-essential patents -- there are alternatives to all of the techniques covered by those patents, but after the industry at large agreed to make IEEE 802.11 the WiFi standard, those alternatives, no matter how good they are in a technical sense, wouldn't allow users to connect with existing WiFi infrastructure.
There's another reason for which I doubt that Motorola will get much mileage out of the Surface argument. The other big issue -- besides hold-up value -- is apportionment. It doesn't really matter that Microsoft now sells WiFi-capable tablets. Even if Microsoft surprisingly started to build airplanes or Mars rovers with built-in WiFi capability, this foray into new strategic business areas wouldn't have any bearing on the value of all IEEE 802.11 SEPs it licenses, or on the relative value of Motorola's patents compared to other IEEE 802.11 SEPs. The Surface features a greater diversity of functionality than the Xbox gaming console (which is also a multifunctional home entertainment system but not a multi-purpose computer like the Surface). That's why its price is higher than that of the Xbox. But the price differential is unrelated to the contributions of IEEE 802.11 to the product, and to Motorola's contributions to IEEE 802.11.
Motorola basically argues that without WiFi, the Surface can't connect to the Internet, but that doesn't make Motorola a key enabler of the multiplicity of functionalities the Surface has on board.
It's really difficult to see what Motorola hopes to achieve by repeating, in different ways, shapes and forms, the same hold-up arguments. At least in the United States it doesn't appear to be a winning strategy. Maybe its strategy will become clearer as the trial unfolds.
The trial is scheduled to run until November 21, 2012, the day before the Thanksgiving holiday, and a FRAND rate-setting decision is apparently not expected before late December at the earliest, and more likely, in early 2013. And my guess is that Google (which micromanages Motorola's patent lawsuits) won't like the result, which is unlikely to be anywhere near the 2.25% royalty rate it demands, and will appeal -- unless the parties can reach an agreement in the meantime, which probably depends mostly on Google's willingness to accept that the FRAND value of Motorola's SEPs is entirely detached from the $12.5 billion it paid to acquire the company.

Tuesday, November 13, 2012

Microsoft-Motorola FRAND dispute is also relevant to standards-implementing startups

Today's the first day of the Microsoft v. Motorola Mobility FRAND rate-setting trial in the Western District of Washington. Motorola Mobility is a wholly-owned Google subsidiary. Its patent litigations are micromanaged by Google's legal department.
Any trial at which two companies of the Microsoft and Google kind clash is important in its own right. And when industry standards are at issue, other tech giants are keeping a close eye on developments and on what could set a key precedent for future disputes over standard-essential patents. A similar trial involving Apple was canceled last week, making today's FRAND trial the first one at which a U.S. court will determine a FRAND license fee for SEPs.
I mostly blog about litigation involving major industry players like these, but I also try to take into consideration the transcendental importance of certain issues to the industry at large -- including small companies and even some that haven't been founded yet but will have to deal with this matter once they reach a certain size.
Yesterday another blogger, Lo Min Ming, published an interesting statistic: "A billion dollar software tech company is founded every 3 months in [the] U.S."
Every single one of these companies implements industry standards in some fashion, and most of them could be put out of business by a FRAND abuser who seeks, wins and enforces injunctive relief after making totally outrageous royalty demands that no responsible business can meet. Even if you can accept such demands a couple of times without necessarily going out of business, there's no way that you can have a viable company if every holder of standard-essential patents makes demands of that kind -- this dilemma is known as "royalty stacking".
Companies that are only a few years old will own very few patents given how long examination takes. And if a company is, say, ten years old, it may already own a number of key non-standard-essential patents, but it's unlikely to hold SEPs, which requires a company to be an influential participant in a standard-setting process.
If Google's Motorola Mobility got its way, SEPs could be used as a nuclear weapon to drive out of business any newcomers depending on the implementation of critical standards. Google wants SEPs to have the effect of mutually assured destruction: if two companies hold SEPs and implement standards on which the other party holds essential patents, they'll have to cross-license (without compensation, or only for very little money) all of their patents (including non-standard-essential ones) or everyone's products will be banned.
While there's only a minority of companies in the industry that shares this vision, Google is not the only one. For example, I also criticized a letter that BlackBerry maker Research In Motion sent to the ITC. In that letter, RIM basically argued that SEP injunctions must be allowed as a response to non-SEP assertions. That's exactly what I just described: the notion of SEPs creating a balance of terror between all those who own them.
I can't and won't support this approach. Apple's newly-minted license deal with HTC and 14 other Android-related license deals announced over the last couple of years prove that reasonable people can resolve disputes over non-standard-essential patents through licensing. I don't think SEP abuse is needed as a response to non-SEP infringement problems of the kind that Google's Android operating system faces.
Even if -- just for the sake of the argument -- one wanted to take the position that Google and RIM's proposal of mutually assured destruction based on SEPs would serve competition in the wireless technology industry well, any proposal must also be evaluated from the perspective of the next billion-dollar tech companies. Unlike Google or RIM, those companies won't be members of the club of SEP holders, at least not in the foreseeable future. Further down the road they may also own SEPs, but before they ever get there, an SEP-owning rival could do serious damage to them through hold-up (including the possibiltiy that new entrants can't leverage the non-standard-essential patents they need to protect their innovation) or, in a worst-scenario, force them out of business if the courts leave the door open to FRAND abuse.
There's a lot that the courts can do to ensure that new entrants will always be able to implement standards on FRAND terms. In the United States, the two most important cases that are pending in this regard are Motorola's Federal Circuit appeal of the FRAND part of Judge Posner's Apple v, Motorola ruling and the FRAND contract case starting in Seattle today. I've already seen the first few tweets out of the courtroom, which reporters say is "packed". If Posner's ruling is affirmed, abusers can't win U.S. injunctions over SEPs, and if Microsoft prevails over Motorola Mobility, an important precedent will be set for the ability of implementers of industry standards to enforce in a meaningful way their entitlement to a license on FRAND terms. That's what's at stake in these two landmark FRAND cases.

Tuesday, November 13, 2012

HTC's biggest patent worry after Apple settlement: 32 Nokia patent assertions in five venues

HTC's settlement with Apple is already the 15th official Android patent license deal, but it's the first license Apple has been known to extend to an Android device maker. HTC was also the first Android OEM to sign up with Microsoft. It will likely become the first one to pay royalties to Apple, Microsoft, and Nokia, which is suing it over 32 different patents in five venues.
I believe in a Nokia-HTC license deal for two reasons. One, Nokia has some really powerful non-standard-essential patents. Its SEPs are broadly licensed, but its non-SEPs account for almost 90% of its portfolio of 10,000 patent families and companies like HTC still need to license it. Two, HTC has proven in the past that it's not interested in endless court fights but quite willing to pay royalties to patent holders. In particular, HTC doesn't have a problem with being the first Android device maker to strike a deal with a given right holder, even though Google is presumably unhappy about the fact that HTC's willingness to enter into royalty-bearing license agreements validates certain infringement allegations against Android and adds pressure on the rest of the Android ecosystem to follow suit and pay up. HTC is simply doing what's best for HTC, just like Google is doing what's best for Google.
In May, Nokia brought an ITC complaint against HTC, federal lawsuits in Delaware against HTC and ViewSonic (a smaller Android device maker), and German lawsuits in three cities (Munich, Mannheim and Düsseldorf) against all three defendants.
HTC and ViewSonic were trying to get Nokia's Delaware lawsuits stayed; ViewSonic was also trying, as a second choice, to have them transferred to California. HTC was previously quite successful with stalling dozens of Apple's patent assertions. It convinced the Delaware-based court to stay all of Apple's offensive cases, not only a companion case to an ITC proceeding. Federal lawsuits mirroring ITC complaints are always stayed pending resolution of the ITC investigation (including appeals) if a defendant so requests. But it's less common that courts also stay other cases involving the same parties only because of some limited overlap in terms of inventors and accused products. HTC tried against Nokia what worked against Apple, but on Friday Judge Leonard P. Stark, the federal judge presiding over Nokia's Delaware actions against HTC and ViewSonic denied all these motions. These actions won't be stayed or transferred, at least at this stage.
The first four Nokia v. HTC court hearings in Germany, three of which are already trials, will be held before the end of the year:
  • On November 21, the Munich I Regional Court will hold a first hearing on Nokia's infringement claims against HTC (and ViewSonic and RIM) over EP1322072 on "a mobile communication system and a method for connecting a remote workstation to a data communication network via a mobile communication network".
  • The Munich I Regional Court will hold a first hearing (I don't knwo yet which patent it relates to) on December 12.
  • Two days later, the Mannheim Regional Court will hold two trials, one over EP1329982 on an "antenna for wireless communications devices" and the other over EP0812120 on a "method for using services offered by a telecommunication network, a telecommunication system and a terminal for it".
These are just four out of 32 different patents Nokia is asserting against HTC. In the United States, Nokia is suing HTC over 18 patents in Delaware, 8 of which are also being asserted at the ITC (where some further streamlining will occur as Nokia confirmed in a recent filing). Nokia is suing HTC over the German parts of 17 European patents (10 in Mannheim, 4 in Düsseldorf, 3 in Munich). Three patents are being asserted on both continents, which is why the total count is 18+17-3 = 32.
Here's a complete list of the 32 Nokia v. HTC patents-in-suit along with the venues in which the assertions were brought:
  1. U.S. Patent No. 5,570,369 and EP0673175 on "reduction of power consumption in a mobile station" (ITC, Delaware, and Mannheim)
  2. U.S. Patent No. 5,884,190 on a "method for making a data transmission connection from a computer to a mobile communication network for transmission of analog and/or digital signals [tethering]" (ITC, Delaware)
  3. U.S. Patent No. 6,393,260 on a "method for attenuating spurious signals and receiver" (ITC and Delaware)
  4. U.S. Patent No. 7,415,247 and EP1133831 on a "method and arrangement for transmitting and receiving RF signals through various radio interfaces of communication systems" (ITC, Delaware, and Düsseldorf)
  5. EP0882375 on a "communication network terminal supporting a plurality of applications" (Mannheim)
  6. EP1439723 on a "communication network terminal supporting a plurality of applications" (Mannheim)
  7. U.S. Patent No. 7,366,529 on a "communication network terminal supporting a plurality of applications" (ITC and Delaware)
  8. U.S. Patent No. 6,728,530 on a "calendar-display apparatus, and associated method, for a mobile terminal" (withdrawn from ITC investigation, still being asserted in Delaware)
  9. U.S. Patent No. 7,106,293 on a "lighting control method and electronic device" and EP1312974 on an "electronic display device and lighting control method of same" (ITC, Delaware, and Mannheim)
  10. U.S. Patent No. 6,141,664 on "synchronisation of databases with date range" (ITC and Delaware)
  11. U.S. Patent No. 7,209,911 on "synchronisation of databases using filters" (ITC and Delaware)
  12. U.S. Patent No. 5,878,351 on "methods and apparatus for providing delayed transmission of SMS delivery acknowledgement, manual acknowledgement and SMS messages" (Delaware)
  13. U.S. Patent No. 6,865,404 on a "handset" (Delaware)
  14. U.S. Patent No. 6,647,370 on a "system and methods for scheduling and tracking events across multiple time zones" (Delaware)
  15. U.S. Patent No. 6,349,263 on an "integrated position and direction system" (Delaware)
  16. U.S. Patent No. 6,587,788 on an "integrated position and direction system with radio communication for updating data" (Delaware)
  17. U.S. Patent No. 7,460,953 on a "method of operating a navigation system using images" (Delaware)
  18. U.S. Patent No. 6,882,870 on a "personal mobile communications device having multiple units" (Delaware)
  19. U.S. Patent No. 6,788,798 on a "method and arrangement for improving leak tolerance of an earpiece" (Delaware))
  20. U.S. Patent No. 5,895,884 on a "shielding device with push fit lid" (Delaware)
  21. EP0998024 on a "modulator structure for a transmitter and a mobile station" (Düsseldorf)
  22. EP1581015 on "a communication network terminal with menus" (Delaware)
  23. EP1516269 on a "system, apparatus, and method for effecting network connections via wireless devices using radio frequency identification" (Düsseldorf)
  24. EP0812120 on a "method for using services offered by a telecommunication network, a telecommunication system and a terminal for it" (Mannheim)
  25. EP1581016 on "a communication network terminal for accessing internet" (Mannheim)
  26. EP0792077 on a "multi-service mobile station" (Mannheim)
  27. EP1329982 on an "antenna for wireless communications devices" (Mannheim)
  28. EP1474750 on a "method and system for storing and transferring multimedia tags" (Mannheim; see this report on a recent Munich court hearing on the assertion of this patent against RIM)
  29. EP0882347 on "a radio telephone" (Mannheim)
  30. EP1246071 on a "method of configuring electronic devices" (Munich)
  31. EP1322072 on "a mobile communication system and a method for connecting a remote workstation to a data communication network via a mobile communication network" (Munich)
  32. EP0982959 on a "mobile telephone user interface for short messages" (Munich)
Based on how both parties fared against Apple, it's easy to see that Nokia will win this and will most likely receive a higher per-unit royalty from HTC than Apple receives from HTC. HTC has to pay Apple, but Apple has to pay Nokia. Nokia has the strongest patent portfolio of those three companies.


MGOMBEA wa Urais wa Marekani kutoka chama cha Democratic, Barack Obama tayari ameshinda uchaguzi huo. Taarifa ambazo mtandao huu umezipata kutoka vyanzo vyake nchini Marekani Obama ameshinda katika majimbo 281 kiwango ambacho mpinzani wake Mitt Romney wa chama cha Republican hawezi kukifikia tena kwa sasa.
Ingawa idadi fulani ya kura bado inahesabiwa mshindi katika kiti hicho inatakiwa angalau ashinde katika majimbo 270, kiwango ambacho Obama kwa sasa amekivuka hadi muda huu.
Romney hadi sasa ameambulia ushindi wa kura za majimbo 203 tu. Kikawaida ili mgombea aweze kushinda uchaguzi wa Marekani, mgombea anahitaji kupata angalau kura 270 katika majimbo.

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